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Abstract
I estimate the energy efficiency premium in unlabeled office buildings by exploiting
variation in mandatory building energy standard implementations, as a result of the
U.S. 1992 Energy Policy Act. A more stringent energy code leads to rent and price
premiums of approximately 4% and 9%, respectively. Significant heterogeneity in the
rent premium is observed based on who pays the utility bills, as would be expected
absent asymmetric information about energy conservation characteristics among real
estate market participants. The rent and price premiums are larger in hotter, more
humid climates, and are consistent with full capitalization of the energy savings from
a more stringent standard.
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1. Introduction
Commercial buildings consume close to 40% of the electricity and 20% of all energy in the
U.S. economy, and mandatory building energy codes affecting the energy efficiency of most
new construction in the U.S. have been credited with delivering significant, cost effective
energy savings.1 If these codes deliver valuable energy savings, both prospective owners and
tenants should be willing to pay a premium to purchase or locate in buildings constructed
under a more stringent energy code, as the energy savings are internalized in these market
transactions. However, market premiums from energy efficiency investments may be miti-
gated due to asymmetric information about a building’s energy use characteristics, which
has been a long-standing subject of debate among economists and policymakers (Gillingham
et al. (2009)).
A frequently cited informational market failure is the landlord-tenant problem in resi-
dential and commercial buildings: when a building’s energy efficiency is costly to observe,
prospective tenants or buyers may not be willing to pay rent or sales premiums for higher ef-
ficiency levels because they are unaware, or unconvinced, of a building’s efficiency attributes.
This weakens the owner’s incentive to invest in energy efficiency, even in cases when it is
economically efficient to do so. Such foregone net beneficial investments may contribute to
an energy efficiency gap between realized levels of energy conservation investment versus the
larger set of economically efficient ones. This principal-agent problem has been widely cited
as a potential source of investment inefficiency that may merit policy intervention (Jaffe and
Stavins (1994); EPA (2003); Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006); Allcott and Greenstone (2012)),
yet no work thus far has empirically assessed the prevalence of landlord-tenant informational
asymmetries in the commercial building stock.
While Energy Star and LEED buildings have recently been associated with rent and
sales price premiums (Eichholtz et al. (2010), Fuerst and McAllister (2011) and Eichholtz
et al. (2013)), green-labeling strategies are a policy response explicitly intended to eliminate
asymmetric information between buyers and sellers (Milgrom (2008)), and consequently
1See Department of Energy (1993), Cort et al. (2002), CEC (2007), EPA (2009).
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observed premiums in labeled buildings cannot settle the question of whether asymmetric
information mitigates the return to energy efficiency. In addition, the value of purchasing
or locating in green-labeled buildings is at least partly related to the intangible effects of
the label, and the voluntary nature of the labeling decision suggests unobservable building
characteristics may account for at least a portion of the estimated premium for a green label.
To address the empirical confounders in previous work on the relationship between energy
efficiency and price premiums in buildings, in this study I make use of exogenous energy effi-
ciency investment variation to assess whether prospective owners and tenants pay a premium
to purchase or locate in energy efficient yet unlabeled buildings. My identification strategy
makes use of a unique dataset of geocoded building-level observations that includes informa-
tion on rental rates, transaction prices, and whether tenants or owners pay for utilities. Each
building is assigned to a particular efficiency level by exploiting year-of-adoption variation
in the implementation of state-level mandatory energy codes, as directed by passage of the
federal Energy Policy Act in 1992. To obtain a credible control sample I match buildings
constructed within three years of each other, just before and just after an energy code came
into effect, located an average of half a mile apart.
Communicating the efficiency characteristics of a building constructed under a more
stringent energy code faces the same challenges as a building in which an owner or developer
has independently made the decision to incorporate energy efficient features. For example,
energy codes do not require monitoring of the building’s energy use attributes, and market
participants do not observe an explicit signal of energy performance. These features of
energy codes create a unique opportunity to test for evidence of asymmetric information
between building owners and prospective tenants or buyers. I utilize these features to develop
three testable hypotheses about energy efficiency value premiums when there is asymmetric
information about energy use: first, energy efficient buildings will not rent at a premium;
second, there will be no observed heterogeneity in rental prices when tenants or owners pay
for energy utilities; and third, energy efficient buildings will not sell at a premium. Having
assessed whether there is evidence to accept or reject each of these hypotheses, I move on
to address whether the estimated premiums are consistent with capitalization of estimated
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building-level savings.
The results indicate that unlabeled buildings constructed under an energy code are as-
sociated with significant rent and selling price premiums of approximately 4% and 9%,
respectively. In buildings where tenants pay directly for their own energy utilities, buildings
constructed under a more stringent energy code rent for approximately 6.5% more relative
to structures built just before a code came into effect. When owners pay utility bills rather
than tenants, on the other hand, the rent premium is negative and statistically insignificant.
Further calculations suggest that for plausible assumptions on the growth of utility costs, the
discount rate and expected ownership or rental contract lengths, the estimated premiums
are consistent with full capitalization of estimated building-level savings.
A number of robustness checks confirm the credibility of the identifying assumptions.
These include testing whether the utility contract structure is unaffected by treatment sta-
tus, a test of the plausibility of the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), a
falsification test in which a new building sample is created with a treatment assignment
that is uncorrelated with the true assignment, evaluating evidence for tenant sorting, and
assessing whether building developers attempted to ‘game’ new code implementations by
concentrating new building construction just before a new energy code came into force.
The observed rent and selling price premiums suggest owners obtain returns to energy
conservation investments even in buildings where it is more costly to observe energy efficiency
characteristics (relative to green-labeled buildings). These estimates indicate that landlord-
tenant principal-agent problems likely do not contribute to an energy efficiency gap in office
buildings, particularly when building occupants pay for their own utility bills, though they
do not rule out other explanations for the gap, including credit market failures (Palmer et
al. (2012)), learning-by-using (Mulder et al. (2003)), or behavioral anomalies (Gillingham
and Palmer (2014)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents information on
building energy code adoptions in the U.S., including details of the 1992 Energy Policy
Act mandate that induced exogenous state-level variation in code implementation dates.
Characteristics of energy codes that may cause potential principal-agent problems in real
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estate markets are also discussed in this section. Section 3 outlines the identification strategy
and empirical model. Section 4 provides a detailed overview of the data set. Section 5
presents the empirical results, and Section 6 briefly concludes.
2. Energy Codes and Asymmetric Information
Background information on energy code development and state-level adoptions is summa-
rized in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 elucidates the characteristics of energy codes that contribute
to the perception that informational market failures lead to the under-pricing of energy ef-
ficiency in buildings.
2.1. Energy Codes
The first commercial building energy standard in the U.S., Standard 90-75, was spear-
headed by a construction industry trade group, the American Society of Heating, Refriger-
ating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE). It aimed to provide uniform guidance on
energy conservation in buildings that could be implemented by jurisdictions wishing to reg-
ulate buildings’ energy conservation characteristics. However, local-level stakeholders found
Standard 90-75 highly difficult to apply in practice, due to its abstruse language, inflexible
options for achieving compliance, and lack of technical support (Shankle et al. (1994)).
Federal involvement in energy standard development began in the late 19070s through
the Building Energy Standards Program (BESP), which brought together government and
building industry participants with the aim to improve Standard 90-75 (Hattrup (1995)).
The BESP collaboration resulted in publication of Standard 90.1-1989 (hereafter ASHRAE
1989), followed by Standards 90.1-1999, 90.1-2004 and 90.1-2007 (heareafter ASHRAE 1999,
ASHRAE 2004 and ASHRAE 2007).2 The requirements in each (increasingly more stringent)
2As an alternative to the ASHRAE standards, some states have adopted the commercial requirements of
the International Energy Conservation Code (IECC), published by the International Code Council. Starting
with the IECC 2001 and ASRHAE 1999 standards, both IECC and ASHRAE have coordinated the design
of their codes so that they would bring about equivalent energy savings. The IECC 2000 code adopted by
some states is equivalent to ASHRAE 1989 except for more stringent lighting requirements. The IECC 2000
lighting requirements are equivalent to ASHRAE 1999 (Winiarski et al. (2003)).
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standard apply to all newly constructed commercial buildings, with the exception of multi-
family residential structures less than four stories in height, which are not under consideration
in this study.
The publication of ASHRAE 1989 was followed by passage of the Energy Policy Act
(EPAct) of 1992, which required states to adopt the most up-to-date version of the ASHRAE
standard. States were given until the end of 1994 to demonstrate both compliance with and
adequate enforcement of the EPAct mandate.3 While, in theory, all states were required
to have begun implementing EPAct by late 1994, varied state-level regulatory and legisla-
tive adoption structures, building industry lobbying activities and concomitant delays in
code enforcement, have led to wide-ranging effective adoption dates for ASHRAE 1989 and
subsequent updates. Energy code adoption at the state-level has typically involved some
combination of public hearings and commentary, approval by advisory bodies composed
of building industry representatives, adoption by state legislatures, and/or signature by a
governor, mayor, or other elected officials. Partly in response to building industry pres-
sure, many states commissioned the DOE for state-specific cost-effectiveness studies before
beginning formal adoption procedures, and litigation from builders’ associations led to sub-
stantial adoption delays in some states. For example, in Michigan litigation led to a seven
year delay in the passage of a state bill to implement the EPAct mandate for commercial
buildings. In Idaho, legal hurdles precipitated a six year delay.4 The EPAct mandate also
requires the DOE to publish a determination regarding whether any newly updated version
of the ASHRAE standard achieves positive energy savings compared to its predecessor. The
publication of these determinations has typically taken 2-3 years, causing further delays in
ASHRAE 1999 and ASHRAE 2004 adoptions.
The post-EPAct federal mandate to adopt an up-to-date building energy standard, the
3State officials were required to submit a certification letter confirming passage of ASHRAE or an equiv-
alent standard. See Department of Energy (2013), for an example.
4Other states that faced litigation attempting to prevent energy code adoptions include Illinois, New
Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Such legal delays created uncertainty regarding when a new energy
code would come into effect. In Michigan, energy code legislation only came into effect after a judge dismissed
a lawsuit following a three-year court case. See the building code assistance project newsletters, BCAP
(2013), for further details.
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resulting heterogeneity induced by the regulatory process in states attempting to comply
with the mandate, and the applicability of the energy standards to the universe of new
commercial buildings constructed after the implementation date, leads to a source of variation
in energy efficiency that is plausibly orthogonal to building-level characteristics.5 Post-EPAct
state-level implementation dates are illustrated in Figure I. I make use of this state-by-year
variation in energy standard implementation dates in my identification strategy, elaborated
in Section 3.
2.2. Sources of asymmetric information
Constructing a building in accordance with an energy standard does not require mon-
itoring of the building’s energy use characteristics after building completion, and market
participants do not observe an explicit signal of energy performance.6 In this respect, com-
municating the efficiency characteristics of a building constructed under an energy standard
faces the same challenges as a building in which the owner has independently made the
decision to incorporate energy efficient features.
In order to obtain a new construction building permit by a local jurisdiction, building ar-
chitects must design structures to satisfy all code requirements and undergo a “plan review”
procedure through a local building department. Obtaining a building permit is contingent
on the building design satisfying all code requirements in place at the time of review. Once a
building permit is obtained, the local building department may perform a random spot-check
once construction has begun, though only a subset of buildings undergo such a site inspec-
tion (Department of Energy (2010); Department of Energy (2010b)). The steps involved in
constructing a building in accordance with an energy standard contrasts significantly with
green-labeled buildings, which require third-party verification and monitoring of building
performance through all stages of construction and initial commissioning (USGBC (2009a);
5Note also that adoption activity is also unrelated to swings in the business cycle, as code adoptions
occurred continuously before, during and after the 2001 and 2008 recessions.
6For example, it’s not possible to observe, from past building permits in jurisdictional records, which
standard a specific building has been constructed under.
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USGBC (2009b)).7 These characteristics of energy standards, and energy efficiency invest-
ments in general, contribute to the perception that asymmetric information may lead to the
under-pricing of energy efficiency in real estate markets.
The potential effect of asymmetric information between landlords and tenants on energy
use decisions in buildings was first noted by Blumstein et al. (1980), citing a number of
building industry professionals’ belief in the difficulty of recouping efficiency investments as
mitigating their interest in energy conservation. While recent evidence suggests this belief
persists among real estate equity investors, lenders and developers, the most pessimistic
views on the likelihood of obtaining value premiums greater than the incremental cost of
energy efficiency investments are held by market participants with no prior experience with
energy efficiency projects (Galuppo and Tu (2010)).8
On the other hand, the rising popularity of ‘green leases’, in which tenancy contracts
explicitly set out how to allocate energy cost savings between owners and tenants (Oberle
and Sloboda (2010)), suggests there is a channel for building owners to benefit from lower
utility costs in energy efficient buildings. Commercial space advertising also utilizes energy
efficiency as a selling point, as exemplified in Figure II. Reed et al. (2004) conclude that
agency issues between landlords and tenants are unlikely to be a major problem affecting
energy use. This conclusion is made on the basis of information regarding the prevalence of
owner-occupied commercial buildings and the general structure of leasing contracts, though
no formal empirical analysis is presented.
The Department of Energy estimates that 50% of office and retail buildings are multi-
tenanted (EIA (2003a)), but this statistic is likely to underrepresent the true value since the
survey on which it is based counts space which is only partially owner-occupied as being
completely owner-occupied.9 This predominance of multi-tenancy structures in commercial
7A green-labeled building must also be re-certified every one to five years in order to retain its labeled
status (USGBC (2012); EPA (2012)).
8Close to 70% of survey participants with prior energy efficiency project experience in Galuppo and
Tu (2010) believe the benefits of energy efficiency investments outweighed the costs, whereas only 40% of
participants without experience do so.
9 See questions C3 and C5 in EIA (2003b). My data, which only categorize a building as owner-occupied
if it is solely occupied by the owner, suggest that out of approximately 91,000 observations with information
on whether a building is owner-occupied or multi-tenanted, about 70% of the buildings are multi-tenanted.
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buildings led a recent study to suggest that over 40% of commercial space may be subject
to agency problems arising from asymmetric information, thereby reducing the incentive
to invest in energy efficiency (Prindle et al. (2007)). Given that landlord-tenant informa-
tional asymmetries may potentially affect a large proportion of office buildings, the preceding
discussion suggests that, thus far, a notable gap in our understanding of the empirical im-
portance of the landlord-tenant problem in commercial buildings is the dearth of reliable
empirical studies.
3. Empirical Strategy
Buildings in the sample are assigned to one of two states: unlabeled energy efficient
buildings constructed under a newly implemented energy code, or unlabeled buildings with
lower energy efficiency attributes (i.e. higher estimated energy use), identified by having
been constructed in the implementing jurisdiction before the energy code was implemented.
Therefore, treated observations denote buildings constructed under a recently adopted code,
and control observations denote buildings that have been constructed under a less strin-
gent code version.10 The outcome of interest is the sample average treatment effect on the
treated (SATT), the average impact of energy codes on rents and selling values in buildings
constructed under an energy code regime. An estimate of the SATT can be obtained by
evaluating the difference between average values (rents or prices) in buildings constructed
after the implementation of a new energy code and buildings constructed under a newly im-
plemented code, had they been constructed under a less stringent code. However, the latter
element of interest is unobserved. My identification strategy generates a credible estimate
of counterfactual building values by exploiting state-level variation induced by mandatory
energy standard adoptions in the wake of the 1992 EPAct, and the data’s geographic preci-
sion to find control observations located within two miles of a treated observation, thereby
holding unobservable, small-scale locational characteristics constant.11
10Where a ‘less stringent code’ may include no energy code.
11Details of the 1992 EPAct mandate are presented in Section 2.1. The reasoning for selecting a 2-mile
radius is discussed in Section 4. Results obtained from steadily decreasing the radius are presented in
Appendix Section A.2.
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3.1. Testable hypotheses
Asymmetric information between building owners and prospective buyers or tenants im-
pacts value premiums in real estate markets when prospective tenants or buyers are unaware,
or unconvinced, of a building’s efficiency attributes. Asymmetric information may also lead
to adverse selection, whereby rents and selling prices for an energy efficient building are
indistinguishable from identical buildings with less stringent energy conservation features.
Specifically, three testable hypotheses can be formulated about the impact of adverse selec-
tion about energy use in real estate markets.
Hypothesis 1: Energy efficient buildings are not associated with rent premiums. Assess-
ing a building’s efficiency level is costly and typically requires some combination of observing
insulation levels, lighting power densities and HVAC equipment efficiencies, or requesting and
analyzing utility bills. Prospective tenants or their representatives might be unable or un-
willing to evaluate a building’s efficiency level or may not be convinced by claims about a
building’s energy conservation characteristics.
Hypothesis 2: Rental premiums are the same regardless of who pays for utilities. Rental
contracts differ in terms of which party is responsible for utility bill payments. In buildings
constructed under an energy code where utilities are paid directly by tenants, tenants will
benefit from lower utility bills and may therefore be willing to pay a premium to locate in
these buildings, relative to buildings where owners are responsible for utility bill payments.
However, this will not be observed if tenants or their representatives are unconvinced of a
building’s efficiency characteristics.
Hypothesis 3: Energy efficient buildings are not associated with sale price premiums.
Owners of buildings constructed under an energy code can benefit from higher net incomes if
they obtain either higher rents (when tenants pay for utilities), or benefit from lower utilities
directly (when owners pay for utilities). However, if current owners are unable to convince
prospective buyers of a building’s energy conservation characteristics, or if prospective buyers
believe they will not be able to convince tenants to pay a rent premium, energy efficient
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buildings will not sell at a premium.12
The following sub-section details the empirical framework used to assess whether these
hypotheses can be rejected. The question of whether the results are consistent with full
capitalization of building-level savings is taken up in Section 5.3.
3.2. Spatial matching and regression
I use spatial matching to create the dataset and regression to estimate the average
treatment effect on the treated, as follows:
Yi = αDi + β
′Xi + δj + εi, (1)
where Di is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if building i was constructed under a recently
adopted building code, Xi denotes the covariate vector, and δj denotes a locational fixed
effect for group j, i.e. building j and the control buildings located within 2 miles of j; the
error term is denoted by εi and is assumed independent of theXi andDi. Covariates included
in the regression include building size, number of stories, and dummy variables for year of
construction, class A buildings, and the presence of building-level amenities.13 In addition to
the preceding list of covariates, the sales sample also includes the change in employment in
the building’s metropolitan statistical area the year prior to sale (to control for changes in the
regional demand for office space), and dummy variables for the year of sale.14 Since energy
prices affect the cost of utilities, and therefore building-level operating costs, prevailing retail
energy prices around the time a building sold may introduce heterogeneity in the willingness
to pay for energy efficiency. To control for this effect I also include the retail price of electricity
12A related informational friction may occur if one considers the possibility that building owner/operators
themselves are not accurately informed about a building’s efficiency characteristics. This possibility does not
alter the empirical hypotheses presented here because the same outcomes would be observed, i.e. no rent or
sales price premiums for energy efficient buildings. The same applies if building owners pay for utilities but
believe tenants may waste energy as a result, thereby disincentivizing an energy efficiency price premium.
13Amenities include: property manager on site, concierge, corner lot, courtyard or atrium, waterfront
location, or the availability of nearby public transit, restaurants, day care, retail shops, or a fitness center.
14Alternative specifications were also tested that included region by time fixed effects do not change the
results.
10
and natural gas for the year before the building sold. Both heteroskedasticity-robust and
clustered standard errors are reported in the results.15
3.3. Heterogeneity in the returns to energy efficiency
Equation (1) estimates the average effect of energy codes on office building values. How-
ever, absent asymmetric information between landlords and tenants, the premiums accruing
to energy efficient buildings are predicted to vary depending on whether tenants or owners
pay directly for utilities. In this section I turn to regression on the matched sample to test
for evidence of this heterogeneity. The estimating equation is:
Yi = αDi + β
′Xi + θ(Utili ×Di) + δj + µi, (2)
where all covariates are the same as those defined in the previous section, with the exception
of interaction term Utili × Di. Utili is a dummy variable equal to one in buildings where
tenants pay for utilities, and it is interacted with the treatment indicator. This variable
assesses whether the premium to buildings constructed under a code is heterogeneous in
buildings where tenants pay directly for utilities. The error term is denoted by µi, and is
once again assumed independent of Xi and Di.
3.4. Identifying assumptions
The crucial identifying assumption is unconfoundedness: controlling for observable co-
variates, the distribution of control outcomes must be the same in buildings with and without
energy codes. Second, there must be a sufficiently dense overlap between the covariate dis-
tributions of treated and control observations, such that outcomes are observed for each
treatment status at all values of the joint covariate distribution. Finally, identification also
relies on the assumption of no general equilibrium effects, also referred to as stable unit treat-
ment value (SUTVA): each buildings’ potential outcomes are not affected by the treatment
15An alternative identification strategy that might initially seem advantageous is a regression discontinuity
design. However, the highly discrete nature of the running variable, year of construction, is not suitable for
the application of local linear regression methods.
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status of other buildings. These three assumptions define sufficient conditions to interpret
the estimated difference in outcomes as the causal effect of energy codes (Barnow et al.
(1980); Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983); Rubin (1986)).
As detailed in Section 2.1, the federal EPAct mandate to adopt a more stringent en-
ergy standard results from a finding of positive energy savings, based on simulated energy
standard impacts in buildings representative of the commercial building stock, and code
adoptions apply to all buildings constructed after the implementation date. Heterogeneity
in the implementation date is largely due to the speed of state-level regulatory processes and
orthogonal to individual building characteristics. However, since buildings constructed under
an energy code are one to three years newer than their matched control observations, and
newer buildings may rent and sell at a premium, the regression-adjustment might not fully
account for this effect in regions where there is poor overlap in the year built distribution.
In addition, an implication of the unconfoundedness assumption is that the covariates are
predetermined, or unaffected by treatment status. A covariate which may conceivably not be
predetermined is the type of rental contract, particularly as it defines who is responsible for
paying utilities. My identification strategy also assumes that constructing a building under
an energy code does not affect potential outcomes in other buildings (also known as the
stable unit treatment value, or SUTVA, assumption). One channel through which SUTVA
violations could occur is if building managers in control buildings undertake energy-saving
behavioral responses as a reaction to the construction of more energy efficient buildings. In
Section 5.2 I present robustness checks to evaluate whether each of these factors might affect
the results.
4. Dataset
Data on office building hedonic characteristics, advertised rental rates (in $/sq.ft./yr.),
and transaction data on the most recent sale price and sale date were obtained from the
CoStar Group, which maintains a building-level database and multiple listing service that
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has been tracking the commercial real estate industry since the early 1980s.16 Each building-
level observation is also geocoded with a precise latitude and longitude coordinate.
CoStar’s transaction notes were used to discard sales observations that were either made
under “distressed” conditions, deferred tax transactions (1031 exchanges), bulk or portfolio
transactions (which results in a sale price per square foot representing an average over several
disparate properties), or non-arm’s-length transactions. Data on the change in employment
the year prior to building sale are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and retail electricity
and natural gas prices are from the Energy Information Administration.
Observations from the rent sample that listed the posted rent as ‘negotiable’ were dis-
carded, as were observations with no listed utility contract type or no listed leasing com-
pany.17 As opposed to the sale price data, the data on rental rates are from posted listings at
the time the data were downloaded, between January and March of 2010, depending on the
state.18 Rental contract types fall into one of three categories: Gross contracts, plus utilities
contracts, and net contracts. Gross contracts quote rental rates inclusive of all services for
the first year of the contract. Subsequent years are typically subject to ‘escalation’ clauses
based on average building-level increases in expenses (including the impact of energy prices).
Plus utilities contracts do not include any utilities in rent, in which case tenants pay for rent
plus a separate utilities bill. In net contracts, all services are paid separately, including
utilities and other costs such as cleaning, and insurance. Hereafter I will refer to a ‘utilities’
contract as a contract where tenants pay directly for utilities - either a plus utilities contract
16CoStar defines an office building as a structure in which the primary use is “to house employees of com-
panies that produce a product or service primarily for support services such as administration, accounting,
marketing, information processing and dissemination, consulting, human resources management, financial
and insurance services, educational and medical services, and other professional services.” CoStar also keeps
information on retail buildings and ‘flex’ buildings that combine features of office and retail structures, but
they are not included in the analysis.
17As discussed in Section 5.2, identifying the leasing company is important as it can be used as a test of
the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA).
18Data from a given state were all downloaded on the same day. Since 2-mile locational dummies are used
in all specifications, including month of download fixed effects do not affect the results.
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or a net contract.19
Buildings were associated with a particular efficiency level by exploiting state-level and
year-of-adoption variation in the implementation of the ASHRAE building energy standard,
as described in Section 2 and illustrated in Figure I. Data sources for energy code adoptions
and further details of the dataset construction can be found in Appendix Section A.1. Iden-
tifying these state-level adoption dates has enabled me to associate buildings in my dataset
as being constructed under a specific energy code regime. The code implementation date
defines when building permit applications were required to satisfy the new, more stringent
energy code criteria in order to be approved by a local building department. Since I observe
the year of construction, not the day on which a building developer obtained its building
permit, and since a lag occurs between the time a building permit is obtained and the build-
ing’s construction, the following decision rule was used. In a given state, if the date of a
new energy code implementation is in January or February, buildings constructed the year
following the code’s implementation year are categorized as having been subject to the new
energy code; buildings constructed before the new energy code (inclusive of the implemen-
tation year) are categorized as controls. If the implementation date of a new energy code
is in March or later, buildings constructed two years following the code’s implementation
year are categorized as having been subject to the new energy code; buildings constructed
before the new energy code are categorized as controls.20 This may lead to some degree
of measurement error if a building is mis-categorized, and therefore to attenuation of the
19Given that advertised rental listings are observed at the same time for all buildings, I assume that the
other services applying to net contracts are the same across buildings in the treatment and control samples.
If the selection on observables and overlap identifying assumptions described in section 3.4 hold, as suggested
by Tables II and III and the falsification test presented in 5.2, this is a plausible assumption.
20This decision rule is based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau that suggests over 70% of multi-unit
buildings are constructed within 13 months of the beginning of construction (see US Census (2010)). This
time frame is most relevant since in cases when a significant lag occurs between permit issuance and the
beginning of construction, most building departments require permits be re-applied for. In addition, the
majority of energy code adoption dates in the data occur after March 1; the following year is used as
the effective year for code-subject construction for implementation dates in January or February because
these dates are observed mostly in warm southern states where construction activity can occur year-round.
A similar decision rule has been used, in a different context, by Jacobsen and Kotchen (2013). I have
also obtained estimates by discarding buildings constructed during the effective year, and the results are
qualitatively unchanged from those reported in the paper (the point estimates are slightly larger and remain
statistically significant).
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estimated coefficients. However, estimates obtained by varying this decision rule by a month
before and after do not significantly change the results reported below.21
Having identified treated buildings as constructed under a specific energy code regime,
the geocode associated with each building was used to create the control sample, composed
of buildings located within a 2-mile radius of a treated building that were constructed before
a given standard came into effect.22 A 2-mile radius was chosen to balance two competing
factors: the desirability of minimizing the distance between treated and control observations
versus the impact on the sample size. The importance of controlling for unobservable loca-
tional characteristics at a fine geographic scale is well-established in the real estate literature
(Bollinger et al. (1998)), and from an econometric standpoint avoiding ‘geographic mismatch’
is important in order to achieve balance among the unobservables in the treated and control
samples (Heckman et al. (1997); Duranton and Overman (2005)).23 However, the pattern of
increasing decentralization and decreasing density in new office space construction implies
that the average distance between buildings is greater in newer buildings (Brueckner (2000);
Lang (2000)), which constrains how small the radius between buildings can be in order to
maintain a reasonable sample size.24
The resulting dataset pools together buildings from multiple treatment-control categories,
composed of treated buildings that could be identified as being constructed under one of
four energy code categories (ASHRAE 1989, IECC 2000, ASHRAE 1999 or ASHRAE 2004),
and control buildings located within a 2-miles of a treated building. A list of treated and
21Appendix Section A.4 presents an estimate of the degree of attenuation bias that may be expected. It
suggests the magnitude of the bias is modest and lies between 0.02 and 0.03.
22Treated buildings and their nearby control buildings must also be located in the same city. This rules
out buildings located within two miles of each other on either side of a city boundary.
23An alternative to matching buildings on the basis of geographic distance is Mahalanobis matching.
The Mahalanobis metric defines two buildings as near each other if they have similar covariates. Matching
buildings in my sample using Mahalanobis distance and all observable covariates results in similar overlap
in the covariate distributions between treatment statuses compared to matching on the basis of geographic
distance. However, since Mahalanobis matching results in considerably larger distances between treated and
control buildings, geographic matching is preferable in this case so as to avoid locational mismatch.
24Both the sales and rent results are robust to limiting the sample to treated and control buildings to a
maximum distance of 0.25 miles apart. Reducing the distance between treated and control buildings below
these values results in a 50-70% smaller sample size, for the sales and rent samples, respectively, and larger
standard errors. See Appendix Section A.2 for more detail on these results.
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control building categories and the share of the rent and sales samples made up of buildings
constructed under a given treatment-control category is presented in Table I.25
Figure III depicts an example of a treated and control building in Scottsdale, Arizona.
They exemplify the low-rise, tilt-up concrete construction practices used in new commercial
building structures that tend to be located outside central cities (Lang (2003)). Since each
observation is geocoded, it is possible to analyze the extent of spatial dependence of the year
built distribution. Many studies have documented the increasing decentralization of new
residential and commercial construction that has been occurring since at least mid-century
(Anas et al. (1998); Glaeser and Kahn (2004); Irwin and Bockstael (2007)), and the spatial
dimension of the data is consistent with this finding. As illustrated in Figure IV, where
office building observations are color-coded by the quantiles of the year built distribution in
Maryland and Texas, newer commercial construction has a tendency to occur at the urban
fringe. This phenomenon is prevalent in all the major urban areas of the dataset.
The dataset obtained from the steps outlined above results in a high degree of overlap
between the covariate distributions in the treated and control samples, with the notable
exception of the building age distribution: buildings constructed under a code are almost
30 years newer, on average, than buildings in the control sample. This is to be expected,
since most of the treated buildings were erected under energy standards that began being
implemented by states in the latter half of the 1990s. To improve this discrepancy in the
year built distribution (and satisfy the overlap identifying assumption), I discard control
observations constructed more than three years before the treated observation it is matched
with. Panels (a) and (c) of Figure V show histograms of the year built distribution by
treatment status before trimming out the older control buildings, while panels (b) and (d)
show the trimmed histograms. The overlap in the year built distribution is much improved
after trimming the sample. Figure VI presents maps of the trimmed rent and sales samples,
respectively.
25The pooled nature of the sample resulted in a small number of buildings appearing simultaneously
as both a treated and control observation; while including these buildings twice in the analysis does not
substantively change the results, in the tables reported below I have dropped such multiple matches. For
each observation appearing as both treated and control, it is only counted in the treatment regime with the
smallest distance to its treated/control observation.
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Table II presents summary statistics for the treated and control buildings in the rent
sample, and Table III presents summary statistics for the sales sample. The tables indicate
the average building is approximately two stories high and measures about 25-30 thousand
square feet, a profile that closely resembles the average office building in the U.S. (EIA
(2012)). The average treated building was constructed in 2005, whereas the average control
building was constructed in 2003. Building sales were observed between 2002 and 2009 for
both the treated and control samples. Average rental rates are higher by 0.60 $/sq.ft./yr. in
treated buildings, and average selling prices are higher by 11.78 $/sq.ft. in treated buildings,
relative to their respective control samples.
The normalized difference for each covariate presented in the last column of Tables II
and III is a measure of overlap among the covariates in the treated and control samples. A
normalized difference less than 0.25 or so is typically considered good overlap (Imbens and
Wooldridge (2009)).26,27 Both tables indicate good overlap for most of the covariates. One
exception is the year built distribution, which exhibits a modest lack of overlap. In both
trimmed samples the mean disparity in the year built distribution by treatment status is
2 years (and, as noted above, is restricted to be no more than 3 years for a given treated
building and its control(s)). This lack of overlap occurs by construction due to the nature of
energy code adoptions; in the following section, I present a falsification test to assess whether
the modest lack of overlap in the year built distribution might affect the results.
26The normalized difference reports the difference in average covariate values by treatment status, scaled
by the square root of the sum of a given covariate’s variance. It is preferable to focus on normalized differences
rather than t-statistics to assess overlap between covariate distributions, since changes in sample size affect
estimated t-statistics but do not affect the plausibility of the overlap assumption. The normalized difference
is therefore a more accurate, scale-free measure of overlap.
27The normalized differences by contract type (rather than treatment status) also indicate good overlap
across all covariates. For example, the normalized difference for building size, stories, and year built are
-0.14, -0.14, and 0.18, respectively. The full table of normalized difference by contract type results is not
reported here but are available from the author upon request.
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5 Results
5.1. Estimated energy efficiency premiums
Table IV shows the results of estimating equations (1) and (2) using the rental sample.
Columns (1) - (3) include estimates of equation (1), and indicate that on average a building
constructed under a newly adopted energy standard rent at a premium of approximately
4%. Columns (4)-(6) presents estimates of equation (2). The results indicate statistically
significant heterogeneity in the rent premium on the basis of which party pays for utilities.
The ‘Utilities × Code’ interaction term identifies buildings constructed under a new energy
code in which tenants are responsible for utility bill payments. The estimate in column
(4) indicates that in buildings where tenants pay for utilities, a more stringent energy code
commands a 6.5% asking rent premium compared to ‘utilities’ buildings constructed just
before a code came into effect.
The last two columns of Table IV present results when equation (2) is estimated on
subsamples of the dataset with relatively hot, humid climates (column (5)), and cooler, low
humidity climates (column (6)).28 Energy use reductions from building-standard induced
conservation investments are predicted to be greater in warm and humid climates relative
to climates with relatively mild winters and cooler, low humidty summers (Federal Register
(2002), Federal Register (2008), Zhang et al. (2013)). This climate-induced heterogeneity
arises because office buildings are highly electricity intensive (Department of Energy (2014)).
Air-conditioning load requirements in hotter, more humid climates significantly increase
office building energy consumption, but also increase the savings generated from an energy
standard. Column (5) in Table IV indicates that heterogeneity in the rent premium is greater
in warmer, humid climates, and column (6) suggests there is no heterogeneity observed
28The sample for column (5) estimates was limited to buildings in Florida, Arkansas, Arizona, Georgia,
Louisiana, South Carolina, Texas and Kentucky. These states (with the exception of Arizona) have average
summer humidity levels above 85% and average summer temperatures above 25 degrees Celsius. Though it is
a state with lower humidity levels, Arizona was also added to the analysis due to the high simulated savings
estimates from energy standards in that state. Omitting Arizona does not substantively change the reported
results. The sample for column (6) estimates was limited to buildings in Utah, Colorado, and Idaho. These
states have average summer humidity levels below 60% and average summer temperatures below 21 degrees
Celsius.
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in cool, low humidity climates. However, the small sample size in column (6) may also
contribute to the noisy estimate.
The coefficient for the ‘Code’ variable in columns (4)-(6) of Table IV is interpreted as the
rent premium in buildings constructed under a code relative to buildings constructed just
before a code came into effect, in buildings where owners pay for utilities. The coefficient
value of -0.039% in column (4) is statistically zero.
Table V presents the sales results. Columns (1) - (3) show estimates of equation (1).
In column (3), which includes all the covariates, transacted sale prices in buildings con-
structed under an energy code are higher by approximately 9%. Results on climate-based
heterogeneity are shown in Columns (4) and (5). The estimated premium in hot climates
is approximately 10%, whereas the premium is close to zero and statistically insignificant in
mild, low humidity climates. Similarly as for the rent results, the small sample size covering
the milder climates likely contributes to this imprecise estimate.29 Nevertheless, these sales
results on climate-based heterogeneity are consistent with simulated energy savings estimates
that suggest greater savings in hotter, more humid climates.
Taken together, these results provide evidence to reject hypotheses one through three,
since more energy efficient buildings are associated with statistically significant rent and
selling price premiums, and statistically significant heterogeneity in the rent premium is
observed on the basis of whether tenants pay for utilities. The falsification test results in
Section 5.2 below also indicate that the findings reported above are not driven by the modest
lack of overlap in the year built distribution.30
It is also interesting to note that compared to the premium for a green-labeled building
(Eichholtz et al. (2010)) the energy standard-induced premium is statistically the same. A
Welch t-test cannot reject the hypothesis that both premiums are equal.
29Sales results for the cool, low humidity climates include observations from Washington State, Oregon,
Colorado, and Northern California counties. There were no observations from Idaho or Utah, so the sample
had to be augmented by observations from these other regions with relatively mild climates.
30For the sales samples I also estimated a specification that includes a variable capturing the amount of
time between the year of construction and the year of sale. For the rent sample I estimated a specification
that includes the amount of time between the year of construction and the year I observed the rent listings
(i.e., 2010). Including these variables does not substantively change the point estimates reported here.
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5.2. Assessing unconfoundedness
My identification strategy assumes that constructing a building under an energy code does
not affect potential outcomes in other buildings (also known as the stable unit treatment
value, or SUTVA, assumption). One channel through which SUTVA violations could occur
is if building managers in control buildings undertake energy-saving behavioral responses as
a reaction to the construction of more energy efficient buildings. While I cannot directly
observe such behavioral responses in the control buildings in my sample, in the rental data
I observe the company responsible for building-level real estate management services. In
recent years, several of the largest integrated property management and leasing companies
(as measured by market capitalization) have begun to incorporate energy use management
as a core area of expertise.31 If control building owners in my sample have undertaken
behavioral responses to the presence of energy efficient buildings constructed under an energy
code, it would be plausible to expect they may hire one of these firms. Columns (1) and
(2) of Table VI presents the results of estimating equation (1), but where the dependent
variable Y is replaced with a dummy variable for whether or not a major real estate services
firm is responsible for property management. The results are highly insignificant, which is
consistent with the identifying assumptions.
To assess whether the rental contract is predetermined with respect to treatment status,
I estimate equation (1) but replace Y with a dummy variable for a utilities contract. Ef-
fectively, this is a test for whether the treatment and control observations in the matched
sample exhibit a statistically significant difference in the fraction of rental contracts that
stipulate tenants must pay directly for their utility bill (‘utilities’ contracts). Columns (3)
and (4) of Table VI presents these results, which are not suggestive of a systematic relation
between the type of rental contract and treatment status, given the statistically insignificant
difference in the prevalence of utilities contracts between the treated and control buildings.
Testing for whether the rental contract is exogenous to treatment status is one approach
to assess the validity of the identifying assumptions. However, this does not control for unob-
31For example, see CBRE (2014).
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servable differences in the assignment of contract types across treated and control buildings.
For example, it is possible that heavy energy using tenants differentially sort into buildings
based on treatment status or utility contract type. While I do not observe tenant energy use
characteristics, I have been able to access additional information from CoStar on the tenants
in California office buildings (representing a subset of the data sample). An analysis on the
basis of tenant-level SIC codes between treated and control buildings, and between buildings
with and without ‘utilities’ contracts, is not suggestive of a systematic difference. Table VII
breaks down California office building SIC codes into 8 different categories, ranging from
Agriculture, Chemicals, Oil & Gas, and Transportation, to Financial & Business Services.
If certain industries falling within one of these categories tend to be more energy intensive,
one might expect differential sorting between more energy efficient (treated) and less energy
efficient (control) buildings. For example, it’s plausible to expect that more energy intensive
tenants may wish to locate in a treated building. In Table VII, both a chi-square goodness of
fit test statistic and the normalized difference were calculated for the treated, control,
utilities and no utilities columns. The chi-square test assesses whether the observed
share of tenants within each category is statistically different from the unconditional average
in the last row of the table.32 The chi-square test cannot reject the hypothesis that at the
SIC code level tenants sort randomly into treatment. The chi-square test for sorting by
utility contract type is rejected, but it is primarily 2 SIC code categories that contribute
to rejecting the null: Communications and Publishing & Allied Industries. Together these
categories make up approximately 2% of the sample. The final columns of Panel A and Panel
B of Table VII also present the normalized difference of the SIC codes within each category.
Most of the normalized differences lie below 0.25, with the exception of Publishing & Allied
Industries and Retail Trade in Panel A (less than 7% of the sample), and Communications
and Wholesale Trade in Panel B (less than 5% of the sample). Altogether there is limited
evidence to suggest that significant tenant sorting on the basis of treatment assignment or
32The chi-square test statistic is χ2=
∑ (observed−expected)2
expected , where the observed value is the percent
share of observations from a given SIC code in one of the treatment or utility contract categories, and the
expected value is the unconditional share in the last row (for example, the unconditional average for tenants
in treated buildings is 26%).
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contract type.
As previously noted, treated buildings in Tables II and III are two years newer than
their matched control observations, on average, and the normalized difference in the means
of the year built distribution by treatment status suggests a modest imbalance in overlap.
To assess whether this may cause a positive bias, I create a new sample testing for spurious
effects of two-year leads of building code changes. The placebo sample is constructed by
subtracting three years from the original coding file that assigns a treatment status to each
building. The resulting data assignment exhibits a similar discrepancy in the year built
distribution as the original file. Placebo ‘treated’ buildings are two years newer on average:
the average ‘treated’ building in the falsified sample was constructed in 2003, whereas the
average ‘control’ building was constructed in 2001. The normalized difference for the year
built distribution is approximately 0.57.33 Treatment status is also uncorrelated in the
original and falsified samples. For example, fewer than 30% of the same buildings appear in
the original versus falsified samples, and buildings that appear in both samples have close
to a 50/50 chance of having a different treatment status in the falsified sample.34
Tables VIII and IX present the results of this falsification test in the rent and sales
samples, respectively. The log rent results in Table VIII, columns (1)-(3), indicate a small
positive difference between the false treated buildings compared to the false controls, but
across all samples it is highly statistically insignificant. There is also no observed hetero-
geneity in the premium based on whether tenants pay directly for utilities (column (4)), or
between hot versus mild climates (columns (5) and (6)). The same picture arises from the
sales results in Table IX. The estimates are highly insignificant throughout all specifications
in columns (1)-(5).
The results in Appendix Section A.2 indicate the robustness to reducing the maximum
allowable distance between buildings. An additional robustness check is presented in the
Appendix, namely assessing whether there is evidence that building developers tried to
33While the summary statistics in the falsified samples are not presented here, they are available from the
author upon request.
34In the rent sample, 21% of buildings in the falsified sample appear in the original sample. In the sales
sample, 27% of buildings in the falsified sample appear in the original sample.
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‘game’ energy code implementations by concentrating new building construction just before
a new energy code came into force (Section A.3). The evidence suggests the results are
unaffected by these checks.
5.3. Evidence for capitalization of the energy savings
Engineering studies have been conducted by the DOE to estimate ex-ante average energy
savings attributable to ASHRAE standards 1989, 1999 and 2004, and the IECC 2000 (Hadley
and Halverson (1993); Department of Energy (2002); Department of Energy (2008)). These
studies estimate the average reduction in site energy use intensity (EUI) per square foot
attributable to upgrading to a more stringent ASHRAE code, relative to the preceding code
in place, assuming that actual construction practice is conducted in accordance with code
requirements.35,36 Based on these studies, the average estimated office building site EUI
savings from upgrading to a more stringent standard range from 6-12%.37 These estimated
energy savings are obtained from a weighted average of the simulated EUI savings from
buildings located in 11 climate regions in the U.S., with weights corresponding to the share
of new building construction in each region.
To obtain an estimate of the average EUI savings arising from the matches in my sample,
I calculate a weighted average of the Department of Energy’s simulated EUI savings for each
treated-control match I observe in the data, in each of the 11 climate regions, with weights
corresponding to the share of the in-sample buildings in each region, for the treated and
control matches constructed under each standard version, as listed in Table I. Performing
this weighted average for the rent and sales samples separately results in similar estimated
35Site EUI is defined as the annual BTU value of energy at the point it enters the building, normalized by
building area; its unit of measurement is thousands of BTUs per square foot per year (kBTU/sf/yr).
36The preceding code in place refers to the code version immediately preceding the code under considera-
tion. For example, the code preceding ASHRAE 1999 is ASHRAE 1989, so DOE simulation studies on the
savings from upgrading to ASHRAE 1999 are based on a comparison with baseline savings in an ASHRAE
1989 building.
37The average savings range of 6-12% for different standard versions masks a considerable amount of
variation in the savings across climate zones in the U.S. For example, in the southern Atlantic region the
savings are typically higher by about 2-5%.
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EUI savings of approximately 12% in the rent and sales samples.38
Assuming reductions in site EUI lead to proportional reductions in utility costs, and
given that office building utilities averaged approximately $3.84/sq.ft./yr. in 2009 (BOMA
(2010)), a 12% reduction in annual building energy costs will reduce utility costs by close to
$0.46/sq.ft./yr., or approximately 2.4% of sample average rent in my sample (which totals
$19.20). Obtaining an estimate of the impact of a 12% utility operating cost saving on
selling prices is a bit more difficult as it requires an estimate of net operating income (NOI),
which I do not observe in the data.39 Office building NOI estimates over the sample period
range from $20-$30 per square foot (BOMA (2010)), Jaffee and Wallace (2009)); in that
case, a saving of $0.46/sq.ft. implies a 1.5%-2.4% increase in NOI. Note that reductions in
site EUI may lead to larger than proportional reductions in utility costs if tiered or time-of-
use pricing is in place, particularly since office building energy consumption is known to be
inelastic even when faced with price increases Jessoe and Rapson (2014). In this case, these
estimates would underestimate the true operating cost savings and increase the present value
of the savings.
These percent savings estimates represent one year of energy savings (as a share of esti-
mated average rent and NOI, respectively), and would therefore accrue to tenants over the
length of a tenancy contract and to owners over the length of ownership. The annual percent
38These estimates are on the high end of the DOE simulation estimates for two reasons. First, the sample
of buildings I observed are disproportionately located in southern regions with larger than average savings.
For example, in the rent and sales samples, 48% and 59% of buildings, respectively, are located in southern
states with the highest estimated savings due to energy standards: Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, North Carolina, New Mexico, Nevada, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. Second, some states
have adopted a standard that skips one standard version and goes directly to a more stringent one if it was
already published at the time of adoption (e.g., in New Mexico and Nevada, ASHRAE 1999 was adopted
when no standard was in place). Note that while the weighted average estimated savings described above
account for regional variation in the energy savings by using 11 representative climate zones, the realized
savings may be higher if average temperatures are more volatile and/or humidity levels are higher among
in-sample buildings, and lower if average temperatures are milder and/or humidity levels are lower.
39The market price of commercial property can be expressed as P0 =
∑L
t=1
NOIt
(1+it)t
, where P0 is the price at
the purchase date, L is the expected length of ownership, NOIt is net operating income (operating income
- operating costs) in period t, and it is the discount rate at t. Therefore, changes in net operating income
affect the selling price. Assuming a flat term structure and that current net operating income is a sufficient
statistic for future net income, the market price can be expressed as P0 = NOI(i−g) , where g is the growth rate
of NOI. Therefore, for a given i and g, a 2% higher NOI for an energy efficient building is associated with
a 2% increase in the price.
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savings can be compared to the estimated rent and price premiums to assess whether the
energy savings are reflected in observed office market pricing outcomes. The point estimates
for selling prices suggests buyers pay a 9% premium for a more energy efficient building,
and the rent premium for locating in an energy code building where tenants pay for utilities
is estimated as approximately 6.5%. Since the savings accrue over the length of a tenancy
contract or over the expected length of ownership, a simple present value calculation, given
plausible assumptions for the growth of utility bill savings, the discount rate, and expected
ownership or rental contract length, suggests it is plausible that the estimated rent and sales
price premiums correspond to complete capitalization of the estimated energy savings.40
The market for purchasing commercial property is increasingly composed of real-estate
investment trusts and mutual funds, which are known to have high annual portfolio turnover
rates (for example, Carhart (1997) finds annual turnover rates of 60-90%). Therefore, while
buildings are long-lived assets the ownership length of commercial building assets is likely to
be considerably lower, particularly for buildings sold in the time period under consideration,
2002-2009. Given the nature of the commercial property market, the discount rate for NOI
savings is best approximated by the return from a plausible alternative investment, such
as the stock market. The S&P 500 averaged a short-term return of approximately 10%-
15% over the period under consideration. Assuming average NOI of $20, the estimated
sales price premium is consistent with complete capitalization of the energy savings for an
expected ownership length of five years, a discount rate corresponding to 12%, and a 2%
growth rate in utility cost savings.41 If an average NOI of $30 is assumed instead, complete
capitalization is consistent with an expected ownership length of 10 years and a 15% discount
40The capitalization calculations below are completed separately for the sales and rent premium because
market pricing decisions are completed by separate parties. Following the real estate literature, purchase
price decisions are assumed to be completed by assessing how lower operating costs will improve net operating
income, whereas rental market prices are assumed to be determined by the expected rent savings accruing
to a tenant over the length of a contract.
41Average annual commercial sector electricity prices in the U.S. increased at a rate of about 3%-4% per
year on average between 2002 and 2009. A 2% increase in the savings over time is assumed in the calculations
since energy efficient buildings are likely to benefit from smaller increases in utility costs.
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rate.42
In the rental market, the discount rate for energy savings can be approximated by the
capitalization rate for commercial buildings, since the volatility of rental income is highly
correlated with the volatility of energy prices (Eichholtz et al. (2010)). Capitalization rates in
the U.S. fluctuated between 4% and 7% between 2005 and 2009 (Chervachidze and Wheaton
(2013)). With a discount rate of 5.5%, the present value of the utility cost savings totals
approximately 2.5% of average sample rent, which is lower than the point estimate but falls
within the confidence interval of the estimated rent premium.43,44
Two additional points are important to note in estimating the plausibility of full capital-
ization. First, as noted above the rent premium is on the higher end of the estimated present
value of the savings. This could be attributed to the fact that the estimated rent premium is
an asking, or advertised rent premium.45 This means that the estimate may include a built-
in bargaining cushion if brokers expect the transacted rent to be lower, thereby bringing the
actual rent premium more in line with the estimated savings. In addition, if prospective ten-
ants are risk averse with respect to utility bill volatility, owners have an incentive to increase
the advertised rent premium (McAfee and McMillan (1987)). Second, since building level
net operating income and utility bills are not observable, other combinations of the variables
assumed above may also produce less than full capitalization. However, the purpose of this
exercise was to show that plausible combinations of these unobserved variables can represent
42Since selling prices are in $ per square foot, the present value of the estimated savings S is
PV = S
L∑
n=0
[(1 + gr)/(1 + r)]n.
43Commercial tenancy contracts typically span over multiple years, typically between 3-15 years. The
average length is approximately 5 years. Service sector lease lengths are on average even longer, compared to
the manufacturing sector (Fisher and Ciochetti (2007)). Taking into consideration the previously cited factors
that may increase energy expenditure savings (tiered pricing or more humid climates), a $0.60/sq.ft./yr.
operating cost saving leads to a present value cost saving representing 3% of average sample rent, whereas
a $0.90/sq.ft./yr. operating cost saving represents 5% of average sample rent.
44Since rents are quoted in $/sq.ft./yr., the present value of the expected savings is
PV = S
L∑
n=0
[gr/(1 + r)]n, where S is estimated savings, gr represents the annualized growth of utility costs
and L is the tenancy contract length.
45Databases with transacted rent data are not available; this is why all papers in the literature have utilized
asking rents (for example, Eichholtz et al. (2010) and Eichholtz et al. (2013)).
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full capitalization, which is certainly possible.
6. Conclusion
The question of whether energy efficient yet unlabeled office buildings command premi-
ums that reflect the value of energy savings has, thus far, remained undetermined. This
is an important question because it can shed light on whether asymmetric information be-
tween current owners and prospective buyers or tenants mitigates the returns to energy
conservation investments in commercial buildings. Assessing the prevalence and impact of
asymmetric information about energy use characteristics, through its impact on pricing in
commercial buildings, is an important step in the determination of the optimal mix of policies
to best address the climate change externality. As noted by Stavins (2011), the realized cost-
effectiveness of carbon pricing strategies is impacted by the pervasiveness of landlord-tenant
agency problems in the building stock. In addition, policies targeted towards addressing
such principal-agent problems need to be crafted to differentiate among heterogeneous end-
uses and contractual structures affecting energy use, as all of these features may affect the
magnitude of the inefficiency.
Since communicating the energy conservation attributes of energy codes faces the same
challenges as when an owner or developer has independently made the decision to incorporate
energy conservation characteristics, energy code adoptions create a unique opportunity to
test for evidence of asymmetric information between building owners and prospective tenants
or buyers. This paper estimates value premiums in buildings constructed under a more
stringent energy code by using exogenous variation in state-level energy code adoptions
over the past fifteen years. I find that on average, unlabeled buildings constructed under
a more stringent energy code are associated with statistically significant rent and selling
price premiums of approximately 4% and 9%, respectively. Significant heterogeneity is also
observed in the rent premium depending on which party (owners or tenants) is responsible
for utility bill payments, and the heterogeneity is greater in hot, humid climates, as would
be expected absent asymmetric information. The premiums plausibly represent complete
capitalization of estimated energy savings in rents and prices. Finally, it should be noted
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that a Welch t-test indicates that both the estimated purchase price premium and the rent
premium are statistically the same as the premium for a green-labeled building. It’s also
interesting to note that green-labeled buildings in are significantly larger and taller than the
average commercial building, whereas buildings constructed under an energy standard are
of similar size and height as the average office building in the U.S., as noted in Section 4.
This is suggestive of a considerable amount of segmentation in the energy efficiency market
(Dickson and Ginter (1987)).
The results suggest that in commercial buildings we likely need not be overly concerned
about the frequently cited suggestion that asymmetric information between landlords and
tenants mitigates the returns to energy efficiency and contributes to an energy efficiency gap.
However, it should be noted that other market failures contributing to an energy efficiency
gap are not ruled out by the results of this study (Palmer et al. (2012), Mulder et al. (2003),
Gillingham and Palmer (2014)). Evidence from a number of settings suggests behavioral
anomalies may lead decision-makers (such as property developers) to undervalue energy sav-
ings when making investment decisions (DellaVigna (2009); Allcott and Greenstone (2012);
Newell and Siikamaki (2014)), though much of the research on the impact of behavioral
failures that affect energy use has, thus far, focused on the transportation sector (Helfand
and Wolverton (2011); Allcott (2011), Allcott and Wozny (2013); Allcott (2013)). Similar
studies applied to the commercial building sector would prove beneficial at improving the
cost-effectiveness of policies aimed at addressing particular market or behavioral failures.
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Figure I: State Adoptions
State 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
AR 
AZ* 
CA ASHRAE 1989 
CO* IECC 2000 
CT ASHRAE 1999 
DC ASHRAE 2004 
DE ASHRAE 2007 
FL 
GA 
IA 
ID 
IL 
KY 
LA 
MA 
MD 
ME 
MI 
MN 
NC 
NE 
NJ 
NM 
NV 
NY 
OH 
OR 
PA 
RI 
SC 
TX 
UT 
VA 
WA 
WI 
WV 
* denotes home-rule states 
Notes: The figure identifies state-level implementation dates for increasingly stringent versions of a
mandatory energy efficiency standard. Record-keeping for state adoptions began improving in the mid-
1990s as a result of the 1992 Energy Policy Act, consequently it is not possible to identify precise ASH-
RAE 1989 adoption dates in states that adopted the standard before 1996. Because of this, ASHRAE
1989 adoptions are only included in the dataset if they went into effect after January 1, 1997 (as is the
case in District of Columbia, Louisiana, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin). In Home-Rule states
(Arizona and Colorado), state-level energy standard legislation cannot be legally enforced in individual
municipalities. However, many jurisdictions in these states have independently adopted energy codes, in
which case I have tracked jurisdictional-level adoptions. Details of the dataset creation are described
in Section 4 and Appendix Section A.1.
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Figure II: Signaling Energy Efficiency
Notes: These two ads were found by entering search terms “energy efficient” in a multiple listing
service for commercial space (www.loopnet.com).
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Figure III: Building Match Example
Notes: Treated and control matches located in Scottsdale, AZ. The building on the left was constructed in
2006. The building on the right was constructed in 2003. ASHRAE 1999 came into effect in September
2003.
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Figure IV: Quantiles of the Year Built Distribution
(a) Maryland (b) Austin and San Antonio, Texas
Notes: Each dot represents a building. The lowest tertiles of the year built distribution (the oldest
buildings) are represented by yellow dots, the middle quartiles are represented by red dots, and the
upper tertiles (newest buildings) are represented by blue dots.
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Figure V: Year Built Distribution (Combined Rent and Sales Samples)
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(d) Trimmed sample (n=2,393; mean=2003)
Notes: Panels (a) and (c) show histograms of the year built distribution by treatment status before trimming
out the older control buildings, while panels (b) and (d) show the trimmed histograms.
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Figure VI: Buildings Data
42
Table I: Treated and Control Categories
Treated Control Rent Sales
ASHRAE 1989 pre-ASHRAE 1989 1.7% 1.9%
IECC 2000 pre-ASHRAE 1989 0.9% 0.2%
IECC 2000 ASHRAE 1989 22.0% 19.1%
ASHRAE 1999 pre-ASHRAE 1989 18.2% 27.3%
ASHRAE 1999 ASHRAE 1989 21.8% 22.9%
ASHRAE 2004 ASHRAE 1989 5.4% 1.5%
ASHRAE 2004 ASHRAE 1999 30.0% 27.1%
Total: 100% 100%
Notes: The data pool together building matches from multiple
treated and control categories, listed above. The last two col-
umns show the share of the rent and sales samples taken up by
buildings paired on the basis of having been constructed under
a given treated-control category.
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Table II: Summary Statistics, RentEnergy Code Summary Statistics, Rentals
Norm. Diff.
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Rent ($/sq.ft./yr.) 19.57 6.04 4.88 50.70 18.97 6.18 1.16 56.92 0.07
Stories 2.29 2.04 1.00 32.00 2.16 2.93 1.00 70.00 0.04
Size (000s) 34.13 39.09 2.29 312.18 36.70 66.91 1.20 1504 -0.03
Built 2005 2.44 1999 2009 2003 2.65 1996 2008 0.55
Class A (%) 19.32 39.51 0.00 100 18.35 38.72 0.00 100 0.02
Utilities (%) 48.81 50.17 0.00 100 42.77 49.49 0.00 100 0.09
Occupancy (%) 70.91 19.70 0.30 100 75.33 18.87 30.25 100 -0.16
Amenities (%) 29.23 45.51 0.00 100 35.58 47.89 0.00 100 -0.10
SIC Code 6952 1650 191 9711 6935 1651 762 9651 0.02
Observations 797 1,335
Avg. Distance: 0.56 miles
The normalized difference measures the degree of overlap for each covariate across the treated and control samples. 
A normalized difference lower than 0.3 is typically considered good overlap.
Treated Untreated
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Table III: Summary Statistics, SalesEnergy Code Summary Statistics, Sales
Norm. Diff.
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Sale Price ($/sq.ft.) 221.21 89.45 35.62 588.85 209.43 79.28 24.07 538.46 0.10
Stories 1.75 1.38 1.00 15.00 1.56 1.01 1.00 13.00 0.11
Size (000s) 25.67 45.01 0.89 350.00 21.42 36.17 1.28 325 0.07
Year Sold 2007 1.69 2002 2009 2006 1.81 2002 2009 0.31
Built 2005 2.29 1999 2009 2003 2.40 1996 2008 0.52
Class A (%) 10.23 30.35 0.00 100 7.20 25.87 0.00 100 0.08
Amenities (%) 21.64 41.24 0.00 100 34.63 47.61 0.00 100 -0.21
High Vacancy 0.009 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.004 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.05
Employment       (%) 1.91 1.97 -7.70 6.35 2.32 2.25 -7.70 6.35 -0.14
Elec. Price (c/kWh) 9.71 2.22 5.67 15.51 9.56 2.13 5.67 15.92 0.05
Nat. Gas Price ($/kcuf.) 11.47 1.99 5.99 15.94 10.57 2.09 5.99 15.53 0.31
Observations 342 722
Avg. Distance: 0.50 miles
The normalized difference measures the degree of overlap for each covariate across the treated and control samples. 
A normalized difference lower than 0.3 is typically considered good overlap.
Treated Untreated
45
Table IV: Rent results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hot, Humid Cool, Low Humidity
Code       0.0499***      0.0499***      0.0407*** -0.0386 -0.0495 0.0756
(0.0111) (0.0152) (0.0168) (0.0446) (0.0442) (0.0707)
Utilities x Code     0.0653**      0.0844* 0.0705
(0.0320) (0.0482) (0.0428)
Utilities   -0.171***    -0.111**  -0.103**
(0.0283) (0.0422) (0.0371)
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Covariates NO NO YES YES YES YES
Robust s.e. YES NO NO NO NO NO
Clustered s.e. NO YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,132 2,132 2,132 2,132 657 90
R-squared 0.65 0.65 0.68 0.70 0.72 0.92
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered errors denotes clustering at the market level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Heterogeneity in the rent premium based on climate is reported in columns (5) and (6).
Full Sample
Table V: Sales results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hot, Humid Cool, Low Humidity
Code        0.0987***        0.0987***      0.0882** 0.1060* 0.0047
(0.0211) (0.0268) (0.0380) (0.0632) (0.1279)
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Covariates NO NO YES YES YES
Robust s.e. YES NO NO NO NO
Clustered s.e. NO YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,064 1,064 1,064 401 67
R-squared 0.65 0.65 0.68 0.65 0.91
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered errors denotes clustering at the market level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Heterogeneity in the sales premium based on climate is reported in columns (5) and (6).
Full Sample
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Table VI: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Code -0.027 -0.024 0.034 0.036
(0.021) (0.027) (0.024) (0.028)
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Covariates NO YES NO YES
Clustered s.e. YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,132 2,132 2,132 2,132
R-squared 0.53 0.53 0.56 0.57
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered errors denotes clustering at the market level.
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Leasing Company Utility Contract
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Table VII: Assessing the Evidence for Tenant Sorting
panel a panel b
treated control norm. diff utilities no utilities norm. diff
n % n % n % n %
Ag., Chem., Oil & Gas, Transport 8 27 22 73 0.21 11 35 20 65 -0.18
Communications 6 25 18 75 0.21 6 25 18 75 -1.04*
Financial & Business Services 274 24 871 76 0.10 442 39 703 61 0.05
General Contractors, Construction 26 33 53 67 0.25 45 58 33 42 0.41
Government & Nonprofits 106 28 271 72 -0.18 145 38 232 62 -0.21
Publishing, & Allied Industries 4 29 10 71 -0.53 9 64 5 36 0.15*
Retail Trade 38 35 72 65 0.43 52 47 59 53 0.01
Wholesale Trade 13 22 47 78 0.06 30 51 29 49 0.54
Total 475 26 1364 74 -0.07 740 40 1,099 60 0.01
Notes: The table reports the number (n) and percent share (%) of observations in each industry category. The industry
categories represent similar standard industrial classification (SIC) codes. Panel A reports values for tenants located in
treated versus control buildings and panel B reports values for tenants who pay for their utility bills directly (denoted
‘utilities’)versus tenants who do not (denoted ‘no utilities’). The normalized difference, calculated using the mean and
standard deviation of SIC codes in each category, is reported in the last column of each panel. Categories that contribute
to rejecting the χ2 test in Panel B are denoted with a *.
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Table VIII: Falsification Test - Rent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hot, Humid Cool, Low Humidity
Code 0.0160 0.0160 0.0268 0.0192 0.0453 -0.133
(0.0127) (0.0133) (0.0241) (0.0287) (0.0649) (0.146)
Utilities x Code 0.00804 -0.00699 0.183
(0.0323) (0.0484) (0.171)
Utilities -0.196*** -0.164*** -0.302***
-0.033 -0.0408 -0.0705
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Covariates NO NO YES YES YES YES
Robust s.e. YES NO NO NO NO NO
Clustered s.e. NO YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,883 1,883 1,883 1,883 681 92
R-squared 0.65 0.65 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.85
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered errors denotes clustering at the market level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Heterogeneity in the rent premium based on climate is reported in columns (5) and (6).
Full Sample
Table IX: Falsification Test - Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hot, Humid Cool, Low Humidity
Code -0.0470 -0.0470 -0.118 0.0342 0.243
(0.0424) (0.0489) (0.0975) (0.141) (0.975)
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Covariates NO NO YES YES YES
Robust s.e. YES NO NO NO NO
Clustered s.e. NO YES YES YES YES
Observations 818 818 818 545 13
R-squared 0.68 0.68 0.7 0.68 0.92
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered errors denotes clustering at the market level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Heterogeneity in the sales premium based on climate is reported in columns (5) and (6).
Full Sample
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Appendix: For Online Publication
A.1 Further details of the dataset creation
In order to obtain code implementation information going back far enough in time to
track adoption dates for ASHRAE-1989, data from a variety of sources were utilized, in-
cluding an online database maintained by the Building Codes Assistance Project (hereafter
BCAP) (BCAP (2010)); archives of BCAP’s bi-monthly newsletters going back to 1997, ob-
tained by e-mail from BCAP staff; the Department of Energy’s online energy codes database
(Department of Energy (2010)); and one report from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD (1997)).46
Renovated buildings were dropped from the analysis: although certain types of building
renovations are subject to an energy code, and CoStar identifies buildings that have been
renovated, it is not possible to identify whether the renovation undertaken in a particular
building triggered energy code requirements.47 Buildings in either treatment category with
occupancy rates below 30% were also discarded so as to avoid effects caused by vacancy rates
due to buildings undergoing renovation or other idiosyncratic (and unobservable) reasons.
Arizona and Colorado are unique states with respect to energy code adoptions. Be-
cause these are ‘Home-Rule’ states, state-level energy standard legislation cannot be legally
enforced in individual municipalities and/or counties. However, many jurisdictions in these
states have independently adopted energy codes; I have tracked jurisdictional-level adoptions
in these states by going through municipal registers (many of which are available online at
46ASHRAE 1989 standard adoptions were more difficult to pinpoint, as in some cases different sources cited
inconsistent dates. More accurate record-keeping for states’ adoptions began improving in the mid-1990s.
As a result, I only include ASHRAE 1989 adoptions if all the data sources had matching implementation
dates. I was not able to find adoption dates for standards prior to ASHRAE 1989. However, as noted in
Section 2.2.1, states only began adopting increasingly stringent energy standards in the mid-1990s as a result
of the 1992 Energy Policy Act mandate, and it is this variation I seek to exploit.
47For example, the most recently adopted ASHRAE standard is applicable to renovations if more than
50% of the lighting fixtures are replaced, but not if the roof and floor are altered where no new cavities are
created, if storm windows are installed, or if existing windows are replaced over an area less than 25% of the
total fenestration area.
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Municipal Code Corporation (2014)), and emailing jurisdictional building officials.48
Some states have adopted their own codes, though in several of these cases the state-
developed code has adopted one of the ASHRAE standards by reference and made only
minor modifications to the original standard. In these states I have relied on estimates of
the energy use intensity (in kBTU/s.f./yr.) of each code update and matched them to the
ASHRAE or IECC standard version with similar energy saving estimates.
A.2 Varying the Distance Between Buildings
Table A1 presents results where the maximum allowable distance between buildings steadily
decreases in 0.25 mile increments, starting with 1.75 miles and ending with 1.0 miles. The
results closely resemble those in the main paper, where the maximum distance is 2 miles.
Table A2 presents the same for the sales sample. Again, the results parrallel those in the
main paper, though some attenuation can be observed as the sample size decreases.
A.3 Manipulating Year of Construction
One concern is that since adoption and implementation dates for energy codes are publicly
known, building developers may try to “game” their building’s construction date by rushing
to obtain their building permits before the new energy code comes into effect, which would
result in a discontinuity in the year built distribution whereby fewer buildings may end up
being constructed in the year or two following a code implementation date.
Figure A1 depicts the distribution of building construction dates in the full sample of sales
and rent observations, two years before and two years after a code came into effect. Close
to 25% of buildings were constructed in each of the four years, slightly more buildings were
constructed after a new energy code implementations, and there is less than a one percent
difference between the share of buildings constructed just before and just after a code came
into effect, all of which are not suggestive of strategic energy code avoidance behavior.
48One issue that may arise with respect to home rule states is the possibility that treatment status may
be correlated with changes in unobserved local regulations, which may bias the estimates. To address any
concerns from this possibility, I have also conducted estimation without buildings from home-rule states,
with no substantive change in the results.
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A.4 Estimate of the Extent of Attenuation Bias
Though it’s not possible to test for attenuation bias directly, a back-of-the-envelope estimate
of the attenuation bias can be obtained from a basic errors-in-variables model (Hausman
(2001)), with the following formula:
− σ
2
u
σ2x + σ
2
u
, (1)
where σ2x is the variance of the energy code treatment variable of interest (x), assuming
it is measured without error, and σ2u is the variance of random (mean zero) unobserved
shocks to x. The observed treatment variable is x˜ = x + u. To approximate the variance
of shocks to x, I use data from the US Census on the average number of months it takes
to construct buildings with 10-19 units from authorization to completion, normalized by 24
months to obtain a variable that ranges between 0 and 1.49,50 To approximate the variance
of the treatment variable, σ2x, I use data on the treatment assignment in the rent and sales
samples, both of which lead to similar observed variance. An alternative data source was
also used to estimate σ2x, namely the share of the post-1992, state-level value of commercial
construction erected under a code, using the treatment assignment arising from the decision
rule used in the main paper. Data on the value of new commercial construction was obtained
from the U.S. Census Bureau. Alternating between the rent sample, sales sample, and value-
of-construction approaches to calculating the variance suggests the magnitude of the bias
ranges from 0.020 to 0.033. This suggests the largest attenuation bias that may be observed
is under 3.3%. This would increase the value of the rent premium (in levels) from 57 cents
per square foot to 59 cents per square foot, and the sale premium from $26.91 per square
foot to $27.79 per square foot.
49I use the 10-19 units measure as it most closely corresponds to the mean building size in my sample.
The observed bias range is unchanged if the average time to build is estimated with buildings larger than 20
units instead.
50 It takes 15 months, on average, to construct a commercial building. I normalize the variable to lie
between 0 and 1 because the treatment variable is a dummy.
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Table A1: Rent results varying the distance between buildings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Code 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.005 0.005
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.0237)
Utilities x Code     0.072**     0.072* 0.054* 0.054*    0.065** 0.065* 0.063* 0.063*
(0.032) (0.039) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.033) (0.038)
Utilities     -0.1554***     -0.1554***      -0.135***     -0.135***     -0.136***     -0.136***     -0.123***     -0.123***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032)
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust s.e. YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Clustered s.e. NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 1,861 1,861 1,763 1,763 1,641 1,641 1,469 1,469
R-squared 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.76
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered errors denotes clustering at the market level.
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.75 mi 1.5 mi 1.25 mi 1.0 mi
6
Table A2: Sales results varying the distance between buildings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Code    0.086**    0.086**    0.079**     0.079**     0.072**     0.072* 0.078** 0.078*
(0.034) (0.040) (0.034) (0.039) (0.035) (0.039) (0.036) (0.040)
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust s.e. YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Clustered s.e. NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 1,028 1,028 1,003 1,003 971 971 932 932
R-squared 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered errors denotes clustering at the market level.
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.75 mi 1.5 mi 1.25 mi 1.0 mi
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